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Christmas 1951 was Harry and Harriette Moore's twenty-fifth wedding
anniversary. ! That night a bomb destroyed their house in Mims, Florida,
killing both of them.2 The explosion was so powerful that some people
thought it had resulted from a rocket accident at nearby Cape Canaveral?
The crime remains unsolved, but there were plenty of suspects. Harry
Moore had made numerous enemies. He was the point man in Florida for
the NAACP and the Progressive Voters League, which had helped register
over 100,000 black voters in the state. Suggested culprits have included the
Ku Klux Klan, a white political boss who lost his reelection bid in a
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. J.D., 1981,
Northwestern; A.B., 1969, Brown University.
1. See BENGREEN, BEIoREHIS TIME:THEUNTOLDSTORYOFHARRYT.MOORE, AMERICA'S
FRST ClVIL RIo-rs MARTYR 7 (1999).

2. See id. at 9, 168-69. Harry Moore was pronounced dead in a hospital about an hour and
a half later. See id. at 171. Harriette Moore lingered for just over a week but died the day after her
husband's funeral. See id. at 186-87.
3. See id. at 9.
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stunning upset Moore helped engineer, a citrus operator who thought he
was disrupting traditional labor arrangements in the groves, and a redneck
sheriff whom Moore had condemned for shooting two handcuffed African
American prisoners charged with raping a white woman.
Ben Green's book about Harry Moore is not a murder mystery, despite
the number of people who wanted Moore dead and the lack of closure
about his assassination. Rather, it is a biography of a man whose demise
made headlines around the world and evoked widespread protests at home
but who today has been almost forgotten.5 The author means to correct that
oversight. Green has produced a useful book that reminds us that there was
a civil rights movement before Brown v. Board of Education.6 The most
celebrated direct action efforts after Brown-the Montgomery bus boycott,
the sit-ins, and the Freedom Rides-all drew on pre-1954 activism.7 Brown
itself culminated years of NAACP litigation coordinated by Charles
Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall. 8 Harry Moore was not, as the
subtitle would have it, "America's first civil rights martyr,"9 but he did
4. Green devotes three full chapters and part of a fourth to the aftermath of Moore's death.
Much of this discussion is informed by the complete FBI file on the case. The file suggests that,
despite its well-known lack of sympathy for and reluctance to take seriously attacks on civil rights
activists, see, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981); KENNETH
O'REILLY, "RACIALMATTERS": THE FBI'S SECRETFII

ON BLACKAMERICA, 1960-1972, at 9-193

(1989); RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER 323-32, 367-73 (1987), the Bureau
conducted a thorough investigation that came tantalizingly close to solving the crime. See GREEN,
supra note 1, at 228-42. One prime suspect committed suicide the day after federal agents
interviewed him. See id. at 245-47.
5. Moore is still remembered in Brevard County, where he lived almost all his adult life. See
GREEN, supra note 1, at 253-54,256. This book also has had some impact, such as the 17-minute
segment that aired last summer on a National Public Radio news program with author Green
prominently featured. See HarryT. Moore'sLife as a Modem CivilRights Leader,NPR Weekend
Edition Saturday, July 3, 1999 (available on LEXIS, News Library, NPR file); "Civil Rights
Marty"(audio version) <http.//search.npr.org/cf/emncrnmpd0l fricfm?PgDate=7A/03/1999&PrglD=7&
prgcode=WE_ AT:>. Moore's work and the circumstances of his death also have been noted by
several scholars. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HEARD, A TWO-PARTY SOUTH? 189 (1952); H.D. PRICE,
THm NEGRO AND SOUTHERN PoLrITcs 45, 57, 117-18 n.29 (1957); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 115 (1994); Steven F. Lawson et al., Groveland: Florida'sLittle Scottsboro,
in THE AFRICAN AMERICAN HERITAGE OFFLORIDA 298,315 (David R. Colbum & Jane L. Landers
eds., 1995).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See, e.g., AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 13-14, 38-39 (1973); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 17-25 (1984).
8. SeegenerallyRICHARDKLUGER,SIMPLEJUSTICE (1976); TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 11667.
9. The Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery, Alabama, covers only post-Brown martyrs,
so it does not recognize Moore. It does include lynching victims such as Emmett Till, however. See
GREEN, supranote 1, at 254-55. On that basis, Cellos Harrison, Willie James Howard, Jesse James
Payne, and Leroy Bradwell-whose lynchings Moore protested and investigated, see id. at 47-50,
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devote almost two decades to the movement before Martin Luther King,
Jr., Malcolm X, or Medgar Evers got involved.'0 Ironically, his efforts were
not entirely appreciated within the NAACP, whose national leadership was
discreetly trying to ease him out at the time of his death because they
disapproved of his style and priorities.
Although the book does not discuss them, Moore is important for other
reasons as well. For one thing, his assassination set in motion a series of
events that culminated in an important Supreme Court decision on the
scope of First Amendment protection against legislative harassment of
political dissidents. Furthermore, Moore's extraordinary efforts have
implications for debates about litigation and political mobilization as
strategies for promoting social reform. This Essay uses Harry Moore's
story to consider some of those questions.
I. HARRY MOORE'S STORY
Harry Moore taught for more than two decades in the "colored" schools
of Brevard County, Florida. He advanced quickly, becoming a principal in
his third year, but soon grew increasingly frustrated by the reality that
separate was never equal under segregation." In response, Moore
organized the Brevard chapter of the NAACP in 193412 and three years
later took the lead in establishing the Florida State Teachers Association,
an organization of African American educators. 3 That group's first priority
was to eradicate racial discrimination in salaries. In Brevard County, for
example, no black teacher was paid as much as the minimum for whites.
The school board refused to eliminate the disparities, so the teachers took
the matter to court with a local attorney. Unfortunately, the case failed.
Worse, the plaintiff was fired and never again held a teaching job.' 4 Green
notes, however, that later cases did outlaw salary discrimination in the
state. 15
55-58, 69-71-should count as martyrs who preceded him in death.
10. See id. at 6. When Moore was killed, King was a graduate student who "maintain[ed] a
steadfast aloofness from racial issues." Id.; see also DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 42
(1986) (noting that King's pastoral evaluations reflected an attitude of "aloofness... which
prevent[ed] his coming to close grips with... ordinary people"). Malcolm X was in jail until
August 1952, when he began his involvement with the Nation of Islam. See GREEN, supranote 1,
at 6; see also THEAUTOBIOGRAPHYOFMALCOLMX 165-66,208-09 (1965); LOUiSA. DECAROJR.,
ON THE SIDE OF MY PEOPLE 91 (1996). Evers had gotten married the day before the Moore
bombing, see MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MIssIsSIPPi 39 (1995), and went to work for the
NAACP in November 1954, see id. at 56; ADAM NOSSiTER, OFLONG MEMORY 42 (1994).
11. See GREEN, supra note 1, at27,30.
12. See id. at 37.
13. Seeid. at35.
14. See id. at 38-41; Gilbert v. H-ighfill, 190 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1939).
15. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 42. Green does not identify the successful case, but he
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Moore also devoted considerable energy to the fight against lynching,
which was a serious problem in Florida. 6 He vigorously pressed state and
federal leaders to investigate several lynchings during the 1940s, including
one incident involving a fifteen-year-old black boy who had sent a
Christmas card to a white girl. 7 In most instances he tracked down
relatives of the victims and got them to give their version of events, which
diverged dramatically from the official accounts.
If Moore's anti-lynching crusade was not enough to get him into
trouble, his political activism certainly was. Moore organized the
Progressive Voters League (PVL) to open up Florida's primary to blacks
following a 1944 Supreme Court decision involving similar discrimination
in Texas."8 One of the group's biggest challenges was in Moore's own
Brevard County, where election officials at first refused to allow blacks to
register as Democrats. It took almost three years to overcome that
problem. 9 Meanwhile, the PVL launched a statewide registration drive that
nearly tripled the number of black voters and endorsed several
congressional candidates in the 1946 Democratic primary.20
These activities proved too much for the white establishment. A month
later Moore and his wife lost their jobs. 2' Shortly afterward, the state
conference of the NAACP hired him as executive secretary.' There would
be a small salary and a shoestring budget, although raising enough money
to cover these items would prove to be a continuing problem for the
organization. 23
All the while, Moore continued his work with the Progressive Voters
League. In the 1948 Democratic runoff primary, which then was
determinative in statewide contests,' PVL-endorsed gubernatorial

probably was referring to McDaniel v. BoardofPub. Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638,641 (N.D. Fla.
1941). For further discussion of teacher salaries, see infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
16. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 45 (noting that Florida had the highest per capita lynching

rate in the country between 1900 and 1930 and that it had the third highest number of lynchings of
any state between 1921 and 1946).
17. See id. at 47-50, 55-58, 60.
18. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
19. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 54,58-59,73.
20. See id. at 54, 59; STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS 134 (1976) (reporting black
registration increased from 18,000 to 49,000 between 1940 and 1947).
21. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 61.
22. See id. at 62-63.
23. See id. at 63-64,76-77,111, 126,159-60.
24. See DAVID R. COmBURN & RICHARD K. SCHER, FLORIDA'S GUBERNATORIAL POLmcs IN

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59-60 (1980). The insignificance of Florida's Republican Party at the
time is suggested by the chapter on the Sunshine State in the classic work on southern politics,
which does not contain a single word about the GOP. See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN

STATE AND NATION 82-105 (1949). In 1950, only six percent of Florida voters were registered
Republicans. See ALEXANDER P. LAMIS, THE Two-PARTY SOUTH 191 (expanded ed. 1988).
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candidate Fuller Warren won by a narrow margin.' The organization had
registered tens of thousands of new black voters, thereby enabling Moore
to claim that the group's endorsement mattered.26 The PVL endorsed
President Truman in the general election,27 but he did not need African
American support to carry the state comfortably,2 By 1950 the number of
black registered voters was about six times the 1944 figure.2 9 That spring
the PVL favored liberal Senator Claude Pepper in his bid for renomination,
but conservative Congressman George Smathers defeated him in a
contentious primary campaign.30 The PVL's greatest triumph that year
came in the general election in Moore's own Brevard County, where
African Americans helped a white write-in candidate upset the local
Democratic political boss who had served twenty-four years on the county
commission."
Moore also had a high profile in the Groveland case, which arose in
July 1949. Norma Padgett, a seventeen-year-old white housewife from the
community of that name, north of Orlando, claimed to have been raped by
four African American men in circumstances that were hauntingly

25. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 74-75. Warren received the PVL endorsement because he
was, according to Moore, "the lesser of two evils." Id. at 75. Warren was widely regarded as more
moderate than his primary opponent. See KEY, supra note 24, at 93,95. Warren turned out to have
a mixed record on racial issues, see GREEN, supra note 1, at 89-90, and tried unsuccessfully to
make a comeback as a segregationist in 1956, see PRICE, supra note 5, at 99. Warren's overall
record can fairly be characterized as undistinguished. See COLBURN & SCHER, supra note 24, at
130, 137-39, 146, 195-96, 205-06, 268, 277, 291, 294; CHARLTON W. TEBEAU, A HISTORY OF
FLORIDA 426-30 (1971); Michael Gannon, A History of Florida to 1990, in GOVERNMENT AND
PouTncs INFLORIDA 7,43 (Robert . Huckshorn ed., 1991).
26. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 73,74-75; see also PRICE, supranote 5, at 65. There is some
confusion about both the size of Warren's victory margin and the number of new black voters.
Green says that Warren won by under 2,000 votes, see GREEN, supranote 1, at 75, whereas a study
of the Florida governorship gives the figure as slightly over 23,000 (out of nearly 600,000 votes
cast), see COLBURN & SCHER, supra note 24, at 97. Similarly, Green gives the number of newly
registered African Americans as 69,000, see GREEN, supranote 1, at 73, while the Florida secretary
of state reported 53,368 registered black voters in 1948, see PRICE, supra note 5, at 33. Whatever
the correct figure, blacks voted in sufficient numbers to give Warren his primary victory. The
significance of this development is particularly noteworthy because as late as 1944, African
Americans were prohibited from voting in Democratic primaries. See id. at 32.
27. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 75.
28. Truman outpolled Republican nomineeThomas Dewey by 15 points statewide in a fourway race. See HEARD, supra note 5, at 26. Truman's margin over Dewey was larger than the
number of African American registered voters. See PRICE, supra note 5, at 33.
29. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 117; see also LAWSON, supra note 20, at 134; PRICE, supra
note 5, at 33.
30. See GREEN, supranote 1, at 116-18.
31. See id. at 118-19, 121-22. Except for the 1948 gubernatorial runoff primary, see supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text, the PVL's influence was greatest in local contests. See HEARD,
supra note 5, at 212-13, 215, 229; PRICE, supra note 5, at 68.
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reminiscent of Scottsboro.32 There was little evidence that her claim was
true, but within hours three suspects (Walter Irvin, Samuel Shepherd, and
Charles Greenlee) were in custody.33 A fourth (Eugene Thomas) was shot
to death following a ten-day manhunt led by Willis McCall, a good ol' boy
sheriff who could have come from central casting.' Green misleadingly
characterizes McCall as a precursor of Bull Connor,3 5 though the sheriff
certainly had a long record of violence toward blacks and close
relationships with the Ku Klux Klan.36
Angry whites tried to lynch the prisoners, but finding that McCall had
transferred them to the state prison, frustrated mobs repeatedly shot up
Groveland's black section over the next few nights and burned several
houses there.37 Meanwhile, McCall told reporters that the three suspects
had confessed, 38 and the Orlando Sentinel ran a front-page editorial
cartoon, captioned "No Compromise"
and showing four electric chairs
39
marked "The Supreme Penaity."
Moore immediately wrote to Governor Warren, whom the PVL had
endorsed in his narrow primary victory the year before, and to federal
32. For the details of her allegations, see GREEN, supra note 1, at 83-84. It is not at all clear
that any rape actually occurred. Norma and Willie Padgett had been married less than a year during
which time he had beaten her on several occasions. The couple might have concocted the rape story
to protect Willie from his in-laws' ire if, as the defense team suspected, he had hit Norma again that
night. See Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 304-05.
33. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 84. The author consistently refers to Shepherd and Greenlee
by their nicknames. Cf.JACKGREENBERG, CRUSADERS INTHE COURTS 93-94 (1994) (consistently
using the men's given names).
34. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 87-88.
35. See id. at 12. Connor was similar to McCall in many ways, but he had been a Birmingham
official since 1937 and was in the process of wearing out his welcome by 1951. During that period
he became increasingly strident and heavy-handed on racial issues, at one point defending the
police officers who arrested Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho for violating a municipal segregation
ordinance while attending a conference in the city. Just days before Harry Moore was murdered,
Connor was caught in a tryst with his secretary. That scandal and other embarrassing revelations
were thought to have ended his political career, but he made a comeback a few years later and
became even more repressive of civil rights advocates. See GLENNT. ESKEW, BUTrORBIRMINGHAM
89-102 (1997); WILjiAM A. NUNNELLEY, BULLCONNOR 14-16,30-36,40-44 (1991); Michael J.
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 116-17
(1994); J. Mills Thornton III, Municipal Politics and the Course of the Movement, in NEW
DIREcroNS INCIVILRIGHTS STUDIES 38,47-49 (Armstead L. Robinson & Patricia Sullivan eds.,
1991).
36. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 52, 80, 208, 251. McCall served 28 years until losing a
reelection bid in 1972, when he was charged with second-degree murder for kicking to death a
black prisoner who was being held for a minor traffic violation (the sheriffwas later acquitted). See
id. at 51, 208.
37. See id. at 84-86.
38. Seeid. at85.
39. kd at 86; GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 95. Cf.Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
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officials demanding prompt action against the mob leaders, whom Sheriff
McCall claimed to know but would not arrest. 40Moore also launched his
own investigation, which revealed that the three prisoners-all of whom
denied any wrongdoing-had been severely and repeatedly punched,
kicked, and clubbed while in custody.41
The defendants went on trial only ten days after reluctant local counsel
agreed to take the case.42 The much ballyhooed confessions were not
introduced.43 Nor did the prosecution present medical testimony about the
alleged rape, fingerprints linking the defendants to the crime, or laboratory
tests of crucial evidence.' Nevertheless, the jury quickly returned guilty
verdicts. Irvin and Shepherd received mandatory death sentences; the jury
recommended mercy for Greenlee, who was only sixteen years old.45 A
year and a half later, the Supreme Court summarily reversed Irvin and
Shepherd's convictions-Greenlee had not appealed--on the ground that
African Americans had been excluded from the grand jury pool.47 Justice
Jackson wrote separately to emphasize the prejudicial atmosphere in which
the trial took place; he complained that reversing on the basis of the jury-

40. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 88-89.
41. See id. at 90-91. Their injuries were still evident three weeks later when FBI agents
photographed them. See id.at 95-96. Despite the FBI investigation, no federal charges were ever
filed. See id.at 97-98.
42. See id.at 99, 100. The defense team consisted of two white Orlando lawyers, a young
black lawyer from Daytona Beach, and Franklin Williams of the NAACP national office. See id.
at 92, 99.
43. Shepherd and Greenlee had confessed but said they had done so only to avoid further
beating by the authorities. See id. at 91. It is not surprising that the prosecution did not try to
introduce the confessions. See GREENBERG, supranote 33, at97; cf.Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 287 (1936) (finding a conviction based solely on a confession obtained as a result of police
beating to be void).
44. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 102.
45. See id. at 104. The judge had arranged for the black defense lawyers to leave the
courtroom immediately after the verdict to escape hostile whites. Nevertheless, a group of Ku Klux
Klansmen chased their car to the county line. See id. at 105, 107-08.
46. See id. at 108, 116. Indeed, Greenlee essentially disappears from the story at this point.
The book's last reference to him concerns his work "on a prison road gang" in February 1952. Id.
at 191. In fact, he was paroled in 1962 and moved to Tennessee. See Lawson et al., supra note 5,
at 318-19.
47. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam); GREEN, supra note 1, at 127.
One African American served on the grand jury. There is some disagreement about how unusual
that was. Green reports that he was the first black grand juror ever to serve in the county. See id.
87. Other writers have said that he was the first in 21 years, see GREENBERG, supranote 33, at 96,
or that he was the second in history, see Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 306. The discrepancy is
immaterial, because the entire process for selecting grand jurors was for all practical purposes
identical with that which the Supreme Court had struck down in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950). Indeed, the per curiam opinion in Shepherd consisted of the word "Reversed" with a
citation to Cassell.See Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 50.
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selection process "is to stress the trivial and ignore the important."4 8
The Groveland case soon took a bizarre turn. In November 1951,
Sheriff McCall shot Irvin and Shepherd while bringing them back from the
state prison for their retrial. He claimed the prisoners, who were
handcuffed to each other at the time, had tried to escape while he was
changing a flat tire along an isolated country road.49 Shepherd died at the
scene, 50 and Irvin was critically wounded.51 The reaction was immediate
and volcanic: even the prosecutor suspected McCall of acting in cold
blood.52
Moore quickly took the lead in pressing for outside intervention and
demanded the sheriff's arrest.53 No charges were ever brought against
McCall despite local, state, and federal investigations. 54Irvin was retried
in 1952, convicted, and again sentenced to death.55 Three years later, newly
elected Governor LeRoy Collins, relying in part on the prosecutor's
recommendation, commuted the penalty to life imprisonment.56
In perhaps the ultimate irony, Moore found himself a target of the
NAACP's national office at the very time he was taking a prominent role
in protesting the Groveland affair. 7 His political activities were viewed as

48. Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 54 (Jackson, J., concurring). See GREEN, supra note 1, at 127-28.
49. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 136-38.
50. See id. at 138.
51. Seeid. at 140.
52. See id. at 140-41. So did a local editor who until then had supported the sheriff. See
Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 313-15.
53. See GREEN, supra note 1,at 142, 151, 163.
54. See id. at 141-42, 146-48, 155, 251.
55. See id.at 191. To comply with the Supreme Court's decision overturning the convictions
in the first trial, the state had seven blacks in the pool from which the jury was selected this time.
Four were disqualified because they were opposed to capital punishment, and the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to strike the other three. See GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 145. Using
peremptories against the three remaining African Americans might be grounds for reversal today.
Cf.Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In the event, the conviction and sentence were upheld
on appeal. See Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla.), cert.denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1953), reh'g denied,
347 U.S. 914 (1954). Habeas corpus relief was also denied. See Irvin v. Chapman, 75 So. 2d 591
(Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955).
56. See GREEN, supra note 1,at 206-07; seealso GREENBERG, supranote 33, at 258; Lawson
et al., supra note 5, at 317-18. Irvin was paroled in 1969 on the condition that he never return to
the county in which Groveland is located. The following year he was permitted to go back for a day
to visit his family and died there of an apparent heart attack. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 207.
57. Moore's principal antagonist was Gloster Current, the national office's director of
branches. Perhaps the conflict would not have arisen had Current's predecessor, Ella Baker,
remained in that position. Baker believed in decentralized organization and grass-roots leadership,
which put her at odds with the NAACP hierarchy during her tenure as director of branches. See
JoANNEGRANT, ELLABAKER: FREEDOMBoUND 47-50, 51,53-55,69-70,73,81 (1998); CHARLES
M. PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM 84-90 (1995); Carol Mueller, Ella Baker and the
Origins of "ParticipatoryDemocracy," in WOMEN INTHE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 51, 57-58,
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inconsistent with the organization's nonpartisan stance, and his support for
Democratic candidates disturbed some important Florida black leaders who
were Republicans.58 Moreover, he was said to be more interested in
working in smaller communities than in major urban centers, a fact that
took on greater significance when the NAACP suffered substantial
membership losses all over the country after doubling its minimum dues
in 1949.' 9 The national office tried to engineer his ouster as early as
November 1950, even though he worked for the state conference rather
than the national organization.' Moore survived that coup attempt, 61 as
well as others in the ensuing months. 62 Finally, over the Thanksgiving
weekend in 1951, the state conference abolished his job. He was offered
the option of serving in the unpaid position of state coordinator, with the
state paying his expenses. 63 Less than a month later Moore was dead, and
the NAACP enthusiastically claimed him as a martyr 4 The story of his
dismissal would not be reported until forty years later.65

II. SOME ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Before assessing Harry Moore's work and analyzing its larger
implications, we need to consider three points that are not developed in
Green's book. The first relates to the challenge to disparities in teacher
salaries, the others to Groveland.

61-62 (Vicki L. Crawford et al. eds., 1990). Baker resigned in 1946, see GRANT, supra, at 242

n.55; PAYNE, supra, at 90, and later went on to serve as administrator of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and to play a substantial role in the founding of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, see GRANT, supra,at 104-20, 126-37; PAYNE, supra,at 91-92, 95-102;
Mueller, supra,at 53-54, 58, 62, 64.
58. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 77, 113, 123. In fact, Florida's newly registered African
Americans were overwhelmingly Democratic. The number of black Republicans in the state
declined slightly between 1944 and 1948, then remained steady for several years. See PRICE, supra
note 5, at 33; see also HEARD, supra note 5, at 228-29.
59. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 77, 111-12.

60. See id. at 123-24.
61. See id. at 124-25.
62. See id. at 126, 129-30.
63. See id. at 160-61. Shortly afterward, a national staff person proposed to remove Moore's
name from the official organizational mailing list despite his new position as state coordinator. See
id. at 163-64.
64. Indeed, the national office organized hundreds of memorial meetings around the country
and raised a substantial amount of money as a result of popular revulsion at Moore's murder. See
id. at 188-90. Moore was also posthumously awarded the NAACP's highest honor at the 1952
annual meeting. See id. at 194.
65. See id. at 213 n.*.
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A. TeacherSalary Litigation
Moore was active in the Florida State Teachers Association, the black
educators group that made discriminatory pay schedules its first priority,
and his involvement in Florida's first lawsuit addressing that issue brought
him to the attention of Thurgood Marshall and then to others in the
NAACP's national office. Green notes that, although the first test case
failed, it paved the way for later cases that succeeded. 66 Unfortunately, the
real story is more complicated than Green suggests.
To be sure, in 1941 a federal district court in Florida denied a motion
to dismiss a salary equalization suit. The court concluded that using race
as a basis for paying different salaries to teachers having the same
qualifications and experience violated the Equal Protection Clause. 67
School boards quickly recognized that they could no longer justify
explicitly race-based salary schedules.68
The response to this new legal reality was the adoption of merit pay
schemes that, while formally neutral, wound up paying black teachers less
than whites. Under the new approach, each teacher would be evaluated on
such factors as physical health, personality, character, attitude, and
instructional skill. A challenge to such a system in Tampa failed in 1943
even though the ratings placed eighty-four percent of the white teachers in
the highest of three possible salary classifications and eighty percent of
black teachers in the lowest. 69 A similar salary arrangement in Miami was
upheld two years later.70 Only when school boards implemented their merit
71
systems in explicitly race-based ways would they run into legal difficulty.
In short, the salary equalization cases had some short-term success but
ultimately had an ambiguous impact at best.
B. Groveland
Green's discussion of the evidence against the Groveland defendants
is also incomplete. Although the gaps in the prosecution's case (absence
of medical evidence, fingerprints, or lab tests of other evidence) raised
questions about whether a rape had occurred much less whether any of the
66. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67. See McDaniel v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638, 640-41 (N.D. Fla. 1941).
68. McDanielwas not the only case to reach this conclusion. See, e.g., Alston v. School Bd.,
112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940); Thomas v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368
(M.D. Tenn. 1942); Mills v. Board of Educ., 30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939).
69. See Turner v. Keefe, 50 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Fla. 1943).
70. See Reynolds v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,326 U.S.
746(1945).
71. For example, the Little Rock school board adopted a three-factor point system and
awarded white teachers twice as much per point as black teachers received. See Morris v. Williams,
149 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1945).
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defendants had been involved, 2 a deputy sheriff offered "damning"
testimony that he had made plaster casts of footprints and tire tracks at the
crime scene that exactly matched Irvin's shoes and Shepherd's car. 3 At
Irvin's retrial, a defense expert suggested that the deputy had faked the
footprints, but the jury nevertheless returned a guilty verdict.74
Green points out that the deputy was charged with doing exactly the
same thing in a 1960 case in which two young black men "languished on
death row for nearly twelve years" for raping a white woman until a federal
judge set aside their convictions.75 He does not explain that the convictions
in the later case were reinstated on appeal and that the death sentences had
already been invalidated.76 The court of appeals emphasized that the state
courts had fully considered the claim of manufactured evidence and
rejected it in a detailed opinion to which the district judge was said to have
given insufficient weight.' We need not resolve whether the deputy faked
evidence, though, because the best that can be said for the footprint and tire
track moldings in Groveland is that they were incompetently made. The
deputy's bungling of the plaster casts was a prime factor in Governor
Collins' decision to commute Irvin's death penalty, something that Green
never explains.78

72. See supra note 32 and text accompanying notes 43-44. A recent book suggests that
Thurgood Marshall, who represented Walter Irvin at his 1952 retrial, suspected that Norma Padgett
might have had consensual sex with at least one of the Groveland defendants. See JOANVWILLAMS,
ThURGOOD MARSHALL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 155 (1998). Marshall might well have made
this comment for rhetorical effect. Cf. TUSHNET, supranote 5, at 3-4 (noting Marshall's penchant
for telling outrageous stories).
73. See GREEN, supranote 1, at 101. These casts were not presented at Irvin's retrial, but the
deputy was allowed to testify about them. See Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288,296 (Fla.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 927 (1953), reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 914 (1954).
74. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 191-92; GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 146.
75. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 207; see also GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 146-47. State
criminal charges against the deputy were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Sheriff
McCall then reinstated the deputy with back pay. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 207; GREENBERG,
supra note 33, at 147.
76. See Shulerv. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D.
Fla. 1972). The prisoners' death sentences were set aside as a consequence of Furmanv. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Shuler, 491 F.2d at 1215 n.1.
77. See Shuler, 491 F.2d at 1216-17, 1219, 1220 (discussing Shuler v. State, 161 So. 2d 3
(Fla.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964)).
78. See TOMWAGY, GOVERNORLEROYCOLLINSoFFLORIDA 66 (1985); Lawson et al., supra
note 5, at 317-18.
There are a few other points that might have put the Groveland situation into broader context.
First, the defendants were charged with a capital offense, something that almost certainly could not
have happened today as a result of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the
Eighth Amendment does not permit the death penalty for raping an adult woman. The Groveland
complainant was 17 at the time of the alleged rape. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 81. Although she
was therefore not old enough to be classified as an adult, she was married. See id. Even if her
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C. Aftermath: From Groveland to Gibson
Finally, Irvin's commutation set in motion a series of events that led to
a Supreme Court ruling on freedom of association. Green does not mention
those later developments, but they are worth considering in any assessment
of Harry Moore's civil rights activities.
Governor Collins' decision to commute the death sentence prompted
suspicions that he had been taken in by Communist propaganda.7 9 The
marriage would not have made her a legal adult, the only statute now in effect that permits
execution for child rape uses age 12 as its upper limit. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073
(La. 1996) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259
(1997).
Second, the book does not fully explain why Charles Greenlee failed to appeal his conviction.
This decision was apparently based on the possibility that a new jury might not recommend mercy.
The prospects were sufficiently doubtful that a rational person might have chosen to accept a life
sentence ratherthan risk execution, especially in a case in which ablack male was accused ofraping
a white female. At that time, in places like Florida, Greenlee's chances for acquittal were extremely
remote. See GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 135 ("a black man accused of rape by a white woman
in the Deep South was always convicted"). Under current law, however, the government may not
seek the death penalty at a second trial if the first trial resulted in a lesser sentence. See Bullington
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (finding that the possibility of a death sentence under such
circumstances impermissibly discouraged convicted defendants from exercising their right to
appeal).
Finally, a development that occurred after the book was published makes clear that Greenlee
could not have been executed for another reason. He was 16 at the time of the alleged rape. The
Florida Supreme Court has determined that the state constitution prohibits the death penalty for
crimes committed by 16-year-olds. See Brennan v. State, No. 90,279, 1999 Fla. LEXIS 1186, at
*12-*30 (Fla. July 8, 1999). Cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the U.S.
Constitution permits execution for crimes committed by 16-year-olds).
79. See WAGY, supra note 78, at 67. Collins was in an awkward political position at the time
due to the legal uncertainties of his status. Dan McCarty, who had been elected to a four-year term
as governor in 1952 after losing narrowly to Fuller Warren in the 1948 Democratic runoff primary,
see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text, died less than a year after taking office. This was
an unprecedented situation in Florida. Charley Johns, whom we shall encounter again shortly, see
infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text, assumed the governor's chair by virtue of his status as
president of the state senate. Nothing else about the situation was clear, however, so the state
supreme court was called upon to resolve the many unanswered questions in a series of lawsuits.
First, the court held that Johns had become acting governor and that a special election should be
held in 1954 to fill the balance of McCarty's term. See State ex reL Ayres v. Gray, 69 So. 2d 187
(Fla. 1953). Two months later the court concluded that Johns could run in that election. See State
ex reL West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1954). The court shortly afterward refused to decide
whether the winner of the special election could seek a full term in 1956, a question of some
significance to potential candidates because the state constitution prohibited a governor from
serving consecutive terms. See Bryant v. Gray, 70 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1954). Collins defeated Johns
in the Democratic primary and easily won the special election. See COLBURN & SCHER, supra note
24, at 76-77; PRICE, supra note 5, at 98-99; TEBEAU, supra note 25, at 439; WAGY, supra note 78,
at 36-39,50-51; Gannon, supra note 25, at49. Several months afterthelrvin commutation, the state
supreme court finally determined that Collins could seek election to a full term. See Ervin v.
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Groveland trial judge empaneled a grand jury to investigate that possibility.
Collins refused to appear, and the final report concluded that the
commutation was an honest gubernatorial mistake. More significant, the
Florida legislature established a committee to investigate subversion. The
committee was proposed and initially chaired by Charley Johns, a
segregationist state senator whom Collins had defeated in a 1954 special
election to fill the unexpired term of a governor who had died in office.8"
The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee's prime target was the
NAACP. 2 The Johns committee, as it was known, demanded the
organization's Miami membership list. This was in line with efforts by
authorities in other states to obtain the names of NAACP members.83
Alabama and Arkansas officials claimed to need the names to verify the

Collins, 85 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1956). Collins won an absolute majority in a six-candidate Democratic
primary and went on to win handily in the 1956 general election. See COLBURN & SCHER, supra
note 24, at 76-78; PRICE, supra note 5, at 99-101; TEBEAU, supra note 25, at 443; WAGY, supra
note 78, at 62-73; Gannon, supra note 25, at 49.
80. See WAGY, supra note 78, at 66-68; Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 318; see also P.B.
HOWELL, JR., PINEY WOODS, SWAMP WATER AND 'GATORTAI.ES' 123-27 (1998). Collins' critics
also arranged for Norma Padgett to confront him at a parade in an effort to embarrass him over the
Irvin commutation, but the episode had little or no impact. See WAGY, supra note 78, at 68;
HOWELL, supra,at 127-28; Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 318.
81. Seesupranote79.On Johns' record as actinggovemor, see DAVIDR. COLBURN&LANCE
DEHAVEN-SMrrlH,GOVERNMEmrnNTHESUNSHNSTATE40 (1999); COLBURN&SCHER, supra note
24, at 140-43, 277-78, 291; PRICE, supra note 5, at 98; TEBEAU, supra note 25, at 438; WAGY,
supra note 78, at 33; Gannon, supra note 25, at 48-49.
Collins also supported segregation, though he was less strident than most contemporary
southern politicians. His low-key approach gave him a moderate reputation, but virtually no
desegregation occurred during his six years in office. See EARLBLACK, SOUTHERNGOVERNORS AND
CIVILRIGHTS 15,93 (1976); COLBURN& SCHER, supra note 24, at 224-27; WAGY, supranote 78,
at 59-103,120-43; David R. Colbum, Florida'sGovernorsConfrontthe BrownDecision:A Case
Study of the ConstitutionalPolitics of School Desegregation, 1954-1970, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION 326, 329-39 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1989). He later served as
director of the Community Relations Service in the Justice Department and in that capacity played
aconstructiverole in several civil rights controversies, particularly in Selma, Alabama, in 1965. See
WAGY, supra note 78, at 179-90. Those efforts contributed to his defeat when he ran for the U.S.
Senate in 1968. See id. at 193-94, 196.
82. The committee also looked briefly at Ku Klux Klan activities but did not pursue that
subject very far. See Steven F. Lawson, The FloridaLegislative Investigation Committee and the
ConstitutionalReadjustment of Race Relations, 1956-1963, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION 296,
307, 321 nn.38 & 45 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1989). Its other targets included
allegedly subversive books and suspected homosexuals at state universities. See COLBURN &
DEHAVEN-SMrrH, supra note 81, at40; JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES
48 (2d ed. 1998); Lawson, supra,at 325 n.77.
83. For detailed accounts of state efforts to harass or outlaw the NAACP, see NUMAN V.
BARTLEY,THERISEOFMASSIVERESISTANCE 212-24 (1969); TUSHNET, supranote 5, at 283-300;
Walter F. Murphy, The South Counter-Attacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL Q. 371,
374-80, 386-88 (1959).
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NAACP's compliance with various business and tax laws. The Supreme
Court rejected those demands because information about individual
members was unnecessary to determine compliance, and disclosure of the
names would have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment
associational rights in places where the NAACP was widely despised."
The committee's rationale for obtaining the list was its desire to
determine whether several alleged Communists were members of the
NAACP. The Florida courts initially upheld the committee because, unlike
in the Alabama and Arkansas cases, the NAACP had not presented
sufficient evidence that turning over the list would subject its members in
the Sunshine State to reprisals or deter other persons from joining for fear
of ostracism (or worse). Later the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
there was persuasive evidence to that effect." Accordingly, the NAACP
need not turn over the list, but the president of its Miami branch, who had
custody of the records, could be required to bring it to a committee hearing
and consult it in response to questions about the membership status of
suspected Reds.87
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,88 the
Supreme Court held that the committee could not compel the witness to do
even that much. The First Amendment precluded the legislature from

84. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating an
Arkansas statute requiring teachers at state-supported schools and colleges to reveal all
organizations to which they had belonged or contributed over the previous five years and noting
that another law, which had been struck down by a lower court, made it unlawful for any member
of the NAACP to work for the state or any of its subdivisions).
The Court also blocked an effort by Louisiana authorities to force the NAACP to turn over its
membership list. That ruling upheld a temporary injunction preventing enforcement of a law that
had been passed in 1924 to deal with the Ku Klux Klan. The state's apparent interest in regulating
organizations engaging in unlawful activity could have been vindicated by less drastic means than
requiring disclosure of the membership list. See Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S.
293, 295-97 (1961). For discussion of another aspect of this case, see infra note 106.
85. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 108 So. 2d 729,743 (Fla. 1958),
cert. denied,360 U.S. 919 (1959); see also In re Graham, 104 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1958) (rejecting
motion to quash committee subpoena for NAACP records in advance of hearing).
86. See Grahamv. FloridaLegislativeInvestigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 133,135 (Fla. 1960).
The subpoenas at issue in the 1958 cases, see supranote 85, lapsed when the committee went out
of existence at the end of the legislative term. In 1959 the legislature reauthorized the committee,
which issued new subpoenas that gave rise to a second round of litigation. See Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 372
U.S. 539 (1963).
87. See Gibson, 126 So. 2d at 129; see also Graham, 126 So. 2d at 135 (dismissing contempt
citation against a committee witness who refused to testify about his own and others' NAACP
membership because that information was available from Gibson, the custodian of the NAACP's
membership list).
88. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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requiring him to refer to the list in response to questions about whether
specific individuals belonged to the NAACP. The Court concluded that it
was unclear whether there was any reason to believe that the alleged
Communists had ever belonged to the NAACP, whether the suspected
individuals were involved in any way with the NAACP (either as members
or simply by attending public events) at the same time they belonged to the
Communist Party, or even whether they still resided in Florida.89
Moreover, there was no evidence that the NAACP was engaged in
subversion or influenced by subversives.9' Because the committee could
not show a sufficient need for the information, First Amendment
associational rights outweighed the legislature's interest in forcing the
NAACP official to rely on the membership list in testifying about the
membership status of particular individuals.91
This decision went beyond previous rulings that imposed limitations on
legislative committees investigating disloyalty and subversion. In Watkins
v. United States,92 for example, the Court in 1957 set aside the contempt
of Congress conviction of a labor union official who refused to answer
questions at a hearing of the House Un-American Activities Committee
about whether some persons with whom he worked had belonged to the
Communist Party in the past. 93 While recognizing that Congress has
"broad" and "inherent" power to investigate, 9' the Court concluded that the
precise subject of the hearing was ambiguous and therefore the committee
had not shown that the few questions the otherwise cooperative witness
refused to answer were pertinent to its investigation. 95
The pertinency limitation turned out to be less than stringent, however,
because the Watkins opinion offered a catalogue of ways for a committee
to specify the subject of its inquiry with sufficient clarity to withstand
judicial scrutiny.9 Two years later, in Barenblattv. United States,' the
Court upheld the contempt conviction of a professor who refused to answer
HUAC questions about his own Communist Party membership. The ruling
rested on the unmistakable pertinence of the questions under the Watkins
criteria, including the opening statement of the committee chair and the
committee's public announcement of the hearing.9 8 The Court reached the
same conclusion on similar reasoning in a pair of 1961 cases upholding
89. See id. at 552-54.

90. See id. at 554-55.
91. See id. at 555-58.
92. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
93. See id. at 185.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 187.
See id. at 206-16.
See id. at 209-11.
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
See id. at 123-25.
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contempt of Congress convictions of a civil rights advocate and an antiHUAC crusader who refused to discuss their Communist Party
membership in circumstances where the questions were deemed pertinent
to the committee's investigation. 9
A related limitation on legislative committees might be called
accountability: the concern that the legislature properly define the
committee's authority. This concern was discussed in Watkins,""' and it
was the basis for the plurality decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire."
Sweezy involved an investigation of subversive activities undertaken by the
state's attorney general acting as a special committee of the legislature. A
university professor refused to answer questions about one of his
classroom lectures or about his involvement in the Progressive Party. The
Court overturned the professor's contempt conviction because there was
insufficient evidence that the legislature had authorized an inquiry into
those subjects. °'2 Post-Sweezy cases showed that the accountability
limitation was also not very demanding. Of particular note, in Uphaus v.
Wyman, 3 decided the same day as Barenblatt, the Court upheld a
contempt conviction against another witness who refused to answer the
New Hampshire attorney general's questions about a left-wing summer
camp. This time the majority concluded that there was a sufficient nexus
between the state legislature's general concern with subversive persons and
organizations and the attorney general's specific inquiries." 4 Other cases
also took a permissive approach to legislative definitions of committee
jurisdiction to investigate subversion.'0 5
The Florida situation differed from both the previous NAACP cases
and the earlier legislative investigation cases, although it shared elements
of all of them. This time the demand for membership information came
from a legislative committee with admittedly wide investigatory power,
rather than from administrators such as those in Alabama and Arkansas
who used economic regulation as a pretext for silencing dissent. At the

99. See Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431,435 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365
U.S. 399, 407-08, 413-14 (1961).
100. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201.
101. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
102. See id. at 251-55. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, who dissented in Watkins, concurred
in Sweezy on the ground that the questions, whether authorized or not, intruded on the professor's
First Amendment rights. See id. at 261-66 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring in the
result). This opinion is perhaps most famous for its strong defense of academic freedom. See id. at
261-63.
103. 360 U.S. 72(1959).
104. See id. at 79-80.
105. See Braden, 365 U.S. at 433; Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 407-08; Barenblatt,360 U.S. at
116-23. Barenblattalso rejected the notion that Sweezy had somehow insulated educators from
questioning by legislative committees investigating subversion. See id. at 121-22, 129.
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same time, the committee purported to be inquiring into possible
infiltration of a loyal organization rather than seeking to expose the
NAACP as a Communist front.1 6 Of course, the Johns committee was
hardly sympathetic to the NAACP. Although Florida proceeded differently
than Alabama or Arkansas, there was good reason to suspect that the real
goal was the same: to undermine the most prominent civil rights
organization in the state. "
This unusual concatenation of circumstances suggests the potential
significance of the Gibson decision. From the standpoint of the legislative
cases, the Florida committee seemed to have a powerful position. It had
clear authorization from the state legislature, and the questions asked of the
witness were surely pertinent to its investigation of Communist infiltration.
Moreover, in contrast to the Alabama and Arkansas cases, the Johns
committee did not demand access to the membership list, and the witness
was willing to testify from memory about whether the suspected Reds
belonged to the NAACP's Miami branch. The organization, from this
perspective, was being given a chance to defend itself against forces that
did not have its true interests at heart. Indeed, the state's intrusion into the
group's affairs appeared minimal. Justice Harlan emphasized all these
points in his dissent. 08 He also emphasized that the committee had at all
times treated witnesses fairly, a factor he had suggested in Barenblattwas
relevant in evaluating challenges to legislative investigations.109
The Court did not explicitly reject these contentions. Instead, Justice
Goldberg's majority opinion found that the committee had not
"convincingly show[n] a substantial relation between the information
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."11 Justice
Goldberg then reviewed the record in exhaustive detail to show the logical

106. There is no small irony in the suggestion that the NAACP needed the state's help to
protect it from Communists. The NAACP and the Communist Party had a long history of tension,
if not outright conflict, that showed the NAACP's ability to separate itself from the party. See
generally WILSON RECORD, RACE AND RADICALISM (1964).
Nevertheless, one other state demanded, as part of its procedures for regulating "non-trading
associations" affiliated with out-of-state groups, that the NAACP affirm that none of its officers
belonged to subversive organizations. The Court invalidated this provision on the ground that the
state organization could not reasonably be expected to know whether the dozens of out-of-state
NAACP officials had subversive connections and should not be required to refrain from engaging
in "wholly lawful activity" because of its inability to file the required affidavit. See Louisiana ex
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293,295 (1961).
107. See Lawson, supra note 82, at 299, 301,303.
108. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 582 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
109. See id.
(Harlan, J., dissenting); seealsoBarenblatt,360 U.S. at 134 (emphasizing absence
of evidence that the committee "was attempting to pillory witnesses" or select them through
"indiscriminate dragnet procedures"). The Court invoked some of this Barenblattlanguage in
Wilkinson. See Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 412.
110. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546.
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gaps in the committee's position.' At first glance, that approach is
unsatisfactory. After all, the state could plausibly claim a "sufficiently
compelling" interest in "self-preservation"1 12to justify the relatively minor
incursions on associational rights at issue.
Perhaps a combination of insights from both opinions can illuminate
the underlying concern and suggest some of Gibson's implications.
Although, as Justice Harlan explained, the Johns committee did not
browbeat witnesses," its purpose was neither to give the NAACP a clean
bill of health nor to minimize the possible damage that might result from
revelation of even limited Communist infiltration into its ranks. The
committee was established as part of Florida's effort to resist desegregation
in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.114 Justice Goldberg's
emphasis on the lack of independent evidence of a 6onnection between the
alleged Communists and the Miami NAACP-he variously referred to
probable cause, nexus, and foundation" 5 -implies the Court's awareness
that the Johns committee had chosen to focus on the NAACP in order to
discredit it. There was no reason to suspect that the organization was
subversive or that it needed the help of a hostile legislative tribunal to
vindicate its loyalty. The committee failed, as Harry Kalven observed, to
explain why it chose to focus on the Miami NAACP rather than the local
Republican party." 6 We might surmise the explanation, though:
Republicans were politically irrelevant in Florida at the time,' 7 whereas
the NAACP was perceived as the vanguard of the movement to overturn
segregation and therefore as a genuine threat to the South's traditional way
of life." 8 In short, the Communist-infiltration rationale was a pretext for
smearing the NAACP, and branding governmental critics as disloyal
strikes at the heart of our constitutional system.
The ultimate implications of Gibsonremain unsettled because the Court
has not had much occasion to address the limits on legislative

111. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.

112. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81 (1959).
113. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 582 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see COLBURN & SCHER, supra note 24, at 224-26; WAGY, supra

note 78, at 87-89; Lawson, supra note 82, at 299.
115. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546.
116. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FroST AMENDMENT 113 (1966).

117. See supra note 24. Florida did support Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, see Stephen C.
Craig, Politics and Elections, in GOVERNMENT AND PoLtis IN FLORIDA 77, 82, 84 (Robert J.

Huckshom ed., 1982), and even went for Hoover in 1928, see KEY, supra note 24, at 317-18,31920; Craig, supra, at 81, 84. Support for these Republican presidential candidates does not
undermine statements about the GOP's general weakness in the Sunshine State. As late as 1956,
barely 13% of Florida voters were registered Republicans; a decade later the figure was still below
20%. See LAMIS, supra note 24, at 191.

118. See Lawson, supra note 82, at 297-98.
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investigations over the past three dozen years." 9 But the concern over
allowing the government to silence its critics has played a pervasive role
in modem First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court has
suggested that the amendment's "central meaning" reflects a deep aversion
to seditious libel.' What the Johns committee was really doing raised the
specter of seditious libel, albeit in more sophisticated form. Perhaps
Gibson will provide a basis for12challenging
the legitimacy of future
1
legislative investigatory excesses.
We cannot attribute these developments entirely to Harry Moore, of
course. The commutation of Walter Irvin's death sentence in the Groveland
case was only one factor, albeit an important one, in the creation of the
Johns committee. That so many other states found ways to harass the
NAACP during the same period suggests that even without Groveland,
Florida segregationists would have pressed the attack." Moreover, the
commutation occurred nearly four years after Moore's death. Even in life,
Moore was hardly the only key player in the Groveland controversy. He
did, however, take the lead in assuring public scrutiny of what might
otherwise have become just another in a long line of racist miscarriages of
justice. In at least a small way, then, his efforts were connected to these
later developments. This tentative conclusion raises larger questions about
the impact of Moore's overall civil rights activities, and those questions are
related to a more general debate over social reform strategies.

119. The Court did invoke Gibson to overturn a contempt conviction in yet another New
Hampshire case involving the attorney general's service as a special legislative committee
investigating subversion. The opinion merely quoted Gibson's"compelling interest" language. See
DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966).

120. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,273 (1964); see Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case:A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT.

REV. 191,209; cf.Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common

law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion.").
121. For a more skeptical view, see Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is JudicialReview in Free
Speech Cases?,69 CORNELLL. REV. 302, 321-23 (1984).
122. Even after Gibson was decided, the state continued to experience high-profile conflict
over civil rights. For example, in 1963 and 1964, Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference led a protest campaign in St. Augustine during which the mother of the
governor of Massachusetts was arrested. See David R. Colburn, The Saint Augustine Business
Community: Desegregation,1963-1964, in SOUTHERN BusINESsMEN AND DESEGREGATION 211,
222-23 (Elizabeth Jacoway &David R. Colburn eds., 1982); RobertW. Hartley, LongHotSummer.
The St. Augustine RacialDisordersof 1964, in ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1963-1964, at 3, 27-39
(David J. Garrow ed., 1989). And as late as 1970, the governor took over a local school system in
a vain effort to prevent court-ordered desegregation. See EDMUND F. KAUINA, JR., CLAUDE KIRK
AND THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION 168-83 (1993).
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HI. HARRY MOORE AND Tm CHOICE BETWEEN LEGAL
AND PoLmcAL REFORM STRATEGmS

The litigation campaign that culminated in Brown is often cited as the
prime example of successful reform brought about through the legal
system. That campaign served as the model for the incremental litigation
strategy against sex discrimination that is most closely identified with
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she directed the Women's Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet the notion that courts
can bring about social reform has been controversial. Harry Moore's work
might shed some light on that debate.
Let us be clear about the insights we could gain from Moore's story,
however. It will not resolve the normative argument over whether the
judiciary should try to promote social reform. Some critics question the
legitimacy ofjudicial mandates for social change. 23 Others emphasize that
reform issues are often polycentric, implicating numerous stakeholders and
a wide array of interests that courts should not try to balance. 24 Courts are
said to lack the institutional capacity to oversee social reform and therefore
should not try to do so."2 From an alternative perspective, various writers
point out that courts address complex issues in such traditional fields as
trust administration and bankruptcy, and they contend that courts are not
necessarily less competent at addressing policy disputes than the other
branches of government. 126 This normative disagreement goes to issues of
political theory, so Moore's experience can be of only marginal relevance
on that front.
Moore's story does have implications for assessing a more factual
question: whether resort to litigation is an effective means of promoting
reform. Perhaps the foremost academic skeptic about relying on lawsuits

123. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989).
124. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394-404 (1978). According to Fuller, a polycentric dispute is like a spider's web, where changes
in the force applied to one strand will redistribute the tension on all strands in complicated and
unpredictable fashion. See id. at 395; see alsoWilliam A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:
InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645 (1982) ("Polycentricity is

the property of a complex problem with a number of subsidiary problem 'centers,' each of which
is related to the others, such that the solution to each depends on the solution to all the others.").
125. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWrrZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POUCY (1977); R. SHEP
(1983).
126. See, e.g., MICHAELREBELL&ARTHURR.BLOCK, EDUCATIONALPOUCYMAKINGANDTHE
COURTS (1982); Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe Judgein PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinaryin
InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS
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to create social change is Gerald Rosenberg. He argues that the judiciary
is constrained by the conventions of legal reasoning, lack of political
independence, and limited resources.127 Courts therefore can be effective
agencies of reform only under very limited conditions, such as where other
actors are able to provide benefits for compliance or impose costs for
noncompliance with judicial rulings, where market-oriented
implementation is feasible, or where court 128
decisions provide leverage or
act.
to
willing
are
who
those
for
protection
Rosenberg argues that none of these conditions existed in connection
with civil rights litigation. Indeed, he goes further and argues that Brown
had no impact whatsoever in bringing about desegregation.129 School
desegregation resulted from joint congressional and executive action
beginning a decade later (the provision of substantial amounts of federal
financial assistance to elementary and secondary schools subject to
nondiscrimination requirements).13 ° Moreover, he maintains, Brown was
not a factor in the passage of either the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Those measures arose from civil rights
activism such as the sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and protest demonstrations in
Birmingham and Selma. 3 ' Moreover, the activists were not motivated by
the Brown decision, but by the Montgomery bus boycott, which had roots
in earlier organizing efforts, and other factors unrelated to the Supreme
Court's ruling. 132 If anything, Rosenberg says, Brown was
counterproductive by stimulating resistance in the white South. 133 The
talent and resources diverted to the ineffectual litigation strategy wound up
weakening
more promising efforts to promote reform through the political
134
process.
Rosenberg's analysis is controversial, to say the least. Michael
Klarman, while generally agreeing with Rosenberg's overall assessment,
believes that Brown's primary effect was to drive southern politics so far
to the right that the rest of the country had no choice but to respond to the
outrages of Massive Resistance. 135 This in turn accelerated the inevitable
demise of segregation, which was doomed by a combination of social,
economic, and political trends. 36 Other critics dispute Rosenberg's
contention that Brown did not inspire civil rights activists, including
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See GERALD N.ROSENBERG, THE HOLOw HOPE 10-21 (1991).
See id. at 30-35.
See id. at 42-49, 70-71.
See id.at 49-54.
See id. 120-21.
See id. at 134-50.
See id. at 155.
See id. at 339.
See Klarman, supra note 35, at 85-149.
See id. at 13-71.
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Martin Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, and other less celebrated figures
who took a leading role in Montgomery and other protests.1 37
More important, perhaps Rosenberg asked the wrong question, or at
least only one of many possible questions. He focused, after all, on "policy
change with nationwide impact."138 Determining causation at the societal
level can be a daunting task, as Rosenberg recognized. 139 A logically prior
difficulty suggests the problem with that inquiry: instigating significant
reform is an extraordinarily complex undertaking. The notion that a single
Supreme Court ruling can create almost instantaneous social
transformation should strike a thoughtful observer as naive, yet this is
precisely the view that Rosenberg ascribes to what he calls the Dynamic
Court model of change."4 There are formidable challenges of finding
suitable plaintiffs and making the necessary factual and legal arguments to
win a lawsuit, as Brown graphically illustrates. Then there are the further
problems of framing an appropriate remedy and obtaining compliance by
the defendants. The Brown Court sought advice from all affected interests
and, following a new round of arguments, remanded the cases to the trial
courts with little guidance about remedial issues. 1 ' Nevertheless, in one of
those cases the authorities in Prince Edward County, Virginia, refused to
comply with a modest desegregation order and closed the public schools
for five years until a new Supreme Court decision ordered them
reopened. 2 Even if defendants implement the remedy in good faith, a
judicial order binds only the parties to the case and those in privity with
them. Officials in other jurisdictions might claim not to be bound by the
ruling and therefore refuse to follow it. That is precisely what happened in
Little Rock, for example, where Governor Orval Faubus defied an order to
admit nine African American students to Central High School. 143 Whether
or not Rosenberg's larger claims about Brown's irrelevance to later civil
rights developments are accurate, then, he properly focuses attention on the
contingencies that make it difficult for the judiciary to mandate large-scale
social reform.
Focusing on the Supreme Court's institutional limitations is not the
only way to think about promoting change through the judicial process,

137. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History:RevisionistDevaluing of Brown
v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 151-52, 154-57 (1994).
138. ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 4.
139. See id. at 207 (noting the difficulty of disentangling the separate effects of essentially
simultaneous legislative, executive, and judicial actions to promote women's rights).
140. See id.at 21-28.
141. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
142. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
143. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958). We need not resolve the debate over the
Court's expansive view of the preclusive effect of its ruling in Brown. See Daniel Farber, The
Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ItL L. REV. 387.
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however. Those who are dissatisfied with the status quo might find
litigation useful as a means of political mobilization or as a catalyst for
change in particular communities or sectors of society. For instance,
advocates of better pay for female workers used the prospect of litigation
as an effective means of organizing public employees and obtaining
favorable contracts even without a sweeping Supreme Court decision on
comparable worth. 144
Similar examples abound in the civil rights context. The organizers of
the Montgomery bus boycott did not rely exclusively on the economic
pressures produced by reduced African American patronage in their quest
for better treatment; they also went to court to challenge the ordinance that
required segregated seating, and the Supreme Court decision in Gayle v.
Browder45 was crucial to the boycott's success.1 46 Even Prince Edward
County, despite the school closing referred to earlier, can be understood
from this perspective. For example, the decision to participate in the Brown
litigation was precipitated by a student strike over the deplorable condition
of the local black high school. In addition to the strike, the NAACP sought
evidence of general support among the local African American community
before agreeing to file suit.147 After the public schools were ordered
desegregated, a private academy was established that enrolled virtually
every white student in the county. Eventually, however, the academy lost
its federal tax exemption pursuant to an Internal Revenue Service policy
that prohibited such favorable treatment for racially discriminatory private
schools. Faced with declining enrollments, the academy later sought to
regain its exemption. In the process, it enrolled a handful of black students,
elected an African American to its board of directors, and established a
minority scholarship fund. The ultimate irony came in the wake of these
developments when the academy sought (unsuccessfully) to retain its
interest as beneficiary of a large trust that contained a whites-only
restriction by arguing that the restriction was unconstitutional. 4 ' To be
sure, the lessons of Prince Edward County are ambiguous. It took many
years for change to occur there, but the process by which the original

144. See generallyMICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994).

145. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
146. See Garrow, supra note 137, at 157.
147. See KLUGER, supra note 8, at 458-78; TlSHNET, supra note 5, at 150-51; Jonathan L.
Entin, Litigation and Social Change in Prince Edward County (1993) (paper presented at Law and

Society Association annual meeting).
148. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741,743
(Va.), cert. denied sub nom. Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. Hermitage Methodist Homes, Inc., 498
U.S. 907 (1990). For further details on the events described in text, see Entin, supra note 147;
Jonathan L. Entin, DefeasibleFees, State Action, and the Legacy of Massive Resistance, 34 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 769 (1993); Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenesfrom the Southside: A Desegregation
Dramain Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCKL.J. 327 (1997).
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lawsuit came to be filed illustrates that reform litigation is a social process:
the decision to sue arose from public meetings that showed widespread,
albeit not unanimous, support among local African Americans for a direct
attack on segregated schools.149 Moreover, the decision to litigate led to the
Brown decision, which was a major factor in all subsequent developments
in Prince Edward County. There were, of course, other causes for these
developments, but the original litigation must be counted as a but-for
cause.
Let us, finally, return to Harry Moore. What does his work have to do
with the debate over courts and social change? Moore was neither a lawyer
nor a litigant, and he never held or even sought public office. Moreover,
none of the Florida cases in which he played a tangential role could be
viewed as efforts to promote large-scale social change. In fact, he was
killed while the cases that
were decided under the umbrella of Brown were
1 50
still in the lower courts.
Nevertheless, Moore's experience illustrates some larger themes from
the debate over reform litigation. The teacher salary cases, for instance,
show both the social nature of reform lawsuits and the contingencies of the
legal process. Black teachers in Florida had long been angry about
discriminatory policies that paid them less than their white counterparts.
Moore helped to establish the Florida State Teachers Association, which
made its first priority to challenge those policies. It took the organization
some time to find a willing plaintiff. Moore took a leading role in that
process, recruiting one of his best friends for the role even though both of
them recognized that the man would be fired and drummed out of the
profession by the white establishment for his temerity. Other lawsuits
followed, and eventually explicitly discriminatory salary schedules
disappeared. At the same time, however, school boards devised other
methods for setting teacher pay and managed to maintain more subtle
disparities that continued to disadvantage African Americans. The results
of this litigation effort were ambiguous at best. But what alternatives were
available to black teachers at the time? The principal one was the political
process, but the Democratic Party controlled the state and remained
resolutely all-white. Under the circumstances, politics was not a
meaningful substitute for litigation.
This leads to perhaps the most significant implication of Moore's work.

149. For further discussion of the litigation campaign culminating in Brown as a social
process, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 138-41,143-44, 147-54 (1987).
150. See Davis v. County Sch. Ed., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Gebhart
v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952). The Supreme Court reversed Davis, Brown, and Briggs, while
affirming Gebhart on grounds that differed from those relied on by the state courts.
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What Moore actually did on behalf of civil rights in Florida raises
questions about the supposedly neat dichotomy between litigation and
politics as reform strategies. Beyond the teacher salary cases, Moore
devoted considerable attention to other problems related to the courts and
the criminal justice system. Groveland was perhaps the most celebrated,
but he regularly pressed for action against lynching and for prosecution of
crimes against African Americans. But he did much more than that. Of
special note, he founded and led the Progressive Voters League, which
registered tens of thousands of blacks and endorsed candidates. Although
the PVL could claim to have affected the outcome of only one statewide
election during Moore's lifetime, it did have some impact at the local level.
There are two important points to be made about Moore's political
engagement. First, he could not have organized the PVL and helped to give
the group whatever political influence it possessed without the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Allwright,151 the 1944 ruling that effectively
outlawed the white primary. 5 2 Only the legal demise of racial restrictions
on participation in the Democratic primary, the phase of the process that
chose the only candidates who had a chance to win general elections at the
state and most local levels, would make voter registration and education
worthwhile.
Second, Moore's diverse efforts in the legal and political spheres
should raise at least tentative questions about specialization in reform
movements. Organizations might well have comparative advantages in
seeking social change, and those comparative advantages might strengthen
the drive for reform. 53 Sometimes, though, the forces favoring change are
handicapped by limited numbers. In such situations, specialization is a
luxury that could have deleterious effects if taken too seriously. Rather
than focusing exclusively on one particular strategy, reformers might
instead seek out targets of opportunity that might promote their larger
goals. So today they might focus on a lawsuit, tomorrow on registering
voters or defeating an especially obnoxious legislative proposal. The risk
of getting spread too thin and losing effectiveness in all areas is apparent,
but sometimes a diversified strategic agenda is a necessity. Harry Moore
tried to work on as wide a front as possible. He wound up enraging his

151. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
152. This is not to say that white Floridians unquestioningly accepted the end of the white
primary. See GREEN, supra note 1, at7l-72; PRICE, supra note 5, at 29-31. Even Texas, where the
white primary had been the focus of litigation since the 1920s, see Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S.
45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), made
a last-ditch attempt to resurrect an all-white Democratic Party. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953). See generally TUSHNL7, supra note 5, at 99-115 (discussing laws enforcing all-white
primaries).
153. See TUSHNET, supra note 149, at 146-47.
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segregationist opponents, who killed him, and alienating some of his
nominal allies in the NAACP, who claimed him as a martyr even while
trying to push him off the stage at the end. Whatever his shortcomings,
Moore had as much success as anyone in fighting racism in Florida in the
decades before his death.
IV. CONCLUSION

Members of the legal profession understandably tend to lionize the
lawyers whose remarkable work led to landmark civil rights rulings by the
Supreme Court. In the process, we overlook the remarkable energy and
personal courage of the ordinary people who put their lives on the line
every day. Harry Moore was one of those people who did extraordinary
work and paid for his efforts with his life. Ben Green has done us the great
service of telling his story. That story is not simply one of facts and dates,
as important as those are. It should also remind us that the polar opposites
of litigation and political mobilization are much more interdependent than
some models of law and society assume.
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